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Successful athletic performance requires precision in many respects. A batter stands behind 
home plate awaiting the arrival of a ball that is less than three inches in diameter and moving close 
to 100 mph. His goal is to hit it with a bat that is also less than three inches in diameter. This 
impressive feat requires extraordinary temporal and spatial coordination. The sweet spot of the bat 
must be at the same place, at the same time, as the ball. A basketball player must keep a ball 
bouncing as she speeds from one end of the court to another, evading defensive players. She may 
never break pace as she lifts from the ground, throwing the ball fifteen feet toward a hoop that is 
eighteen inches in diameter.  
 Familiarity with professional-level play might lead one to lose sight of the exactness of the 
skills involved. For a good and amusing remedy to this, watch a few minutes of the Robocup. This 
annual soccer tournament matches teams consisting of the most technologically advanced robots on 
Earth. The robots shuffle around the field, slowly. They occasionally bump into each other, causing 
one or both to fall down. While a human soccer player moves smoothly toward a ball, never 
breaking stride as he controls it with his foot until lofting a pass to a player downfield, the robot’s 
encounter with the ball is anything but fluid. It stops in front of the ball, inspecting it as though it’s 
some unknown object that’s just fallen from outer space. It bounces from foot to foot before 
carefully orienting itself just so. The kick, when it finally comes, sends the ball rolling a few feet, 
typically in a random direction. If it hasn’t fallen on its butt, the robot freezes, it’s work done.  
 Although athletes differ from non-athletes in the finesse they bring to particular situations, 
we must all of us move our limbs and torso and head so that we walk smoothly, reach accurately, 
bend and twist appropriately, and keep our eyes fixed on objects as they move past us. Thus, one 
task facing a psychologist involves explaining how the body does such things within the sometimes 
very demanding spatial and temporal constraints that a given task imposes. Part of the goal of this 
chapter is to sketch the commitments of an embodied approach to such an explanation. We shall see 
that an embodied account of motor skills draws concepts that depart radically from more traditional 
cognitivist theories of motor activity. Similarly, because an embodied approach to cognition 
introduces new ways to understand the human capacity for social interaction, it also promises to 
shed new light on how athletes coordinate their actions with each other. 
1. Themes of Embodiment 
 “Embodied Cognition” is best understood as a label for a diverse research program that 
spans work across the cognitive spectrum, including memory (Glenberg 1997), perception (O’Regan 
and Noë 2001), language (Kaschak, et al. 2005), and emotion (Barrett 2012) (see Shapiro 2014a for a 
representative collection). Additionally, it takes as its subject matter not just human beings, but 
simple organisms such as crickets (Webb 1996), simulated agents (Beer 2003), and robots (Brooks 
1991). Given its breadth, the job of offering a succinct characterization of embodied cognition faces 
obvious difficulties.  
 Yet another challenge besets efforts to articulate the distinctive character of embodied 
cognition. Traditional cognitive psychology, not to mention many of its scientific predecessors, 
recognized the body’s significance in thought processes. Indeed, Descartes, famous for his 
distinction between mind and body, nevertheless denied that the relationship between mind and 
body is simply like that of sailor in a ship. Rather, he insisted, “I am most tightly joined and, so to 
speak, commingled with it, so much so that I and the body constitute one single thing.” (1641/1993: 
53). Granting that investigations of cognition have, for centuries, acknowledged close ties between 
mind and body, a natural question arises: What new or novel connections between mind and body 
has embodied cognition discovered? 
 One of us (Shapiro 2008, 2011, 2012) has sought to respond to both worries above – how to 
limn the boundaries of embodied cognition given its wide scope and how to isolate those features of 
embodied cognition that mark it is a new approach to psychology – by describing various “themes” 
that pop up repeatedly in the various areas that embodied cognition researchers investigate. One 
such theme is Conceptualization. Research that supports conceptualization reveals that the 
properties of a body constrain and thus influence how an organism conceives of its world. This idea 
builds on the Gibsonian notion of an affordance (Gibson 1979). Gibson argued that organisms 
perceive their environments in terms of how they may interact with the objects they encounter. 
Thus, a branch that a bird perceives as something to perch on might be perceived by a monkey as 
something to swing from. A prominent area of embodied cognition – enactivism – takes this 
Gibsonian suggestion further, arguing that the perceived world is a consequence of the actions the 
body takes toward it. (O’Regan & Nöe 2001, Nöe 2004). Thus, insofar as different kinds of 
organisms have different kinds of bodies, and different kinds of bodies interact with the world in 
different ways, differently embodied organisms perceive, and thus conceive, of the same world in 
different ways. We shall take up the Conceptualization theme in the final section of this chapter, 
where we discuss work that reveals athletes to possess special perceptual abilities as a result of their 
training. 
 A second theme of embodiment Shapiro describes is Constitution. Claims concerning 
constitution are especially common in an area of embodied cognition devoted to showing how 
cognition might extend beyond the brain. Much of this research focuses less on the actual body’s 
contribution to cognition than it does on the use of external “props”, such as calculators or diaries, 
to enhance cognition. For instance, Clark and Chalmers (1998) imagine a scenario involving a man, 
Otto, who relies extensively on his diary in order to compensate for the loss of his “natural” 
memory. On their view, the entries in the diary constitute actual memories, no less authentic than 
those that once would have been stored in Otto’s hippocampus. More generally, those who pursue 
the idea of Constitution seek to show how parts of the world might be recruited to become parts 
(constituents) of a cognitive system. The challenge these researchers face is to defend the claim that 
parts of the world qualify as actual constituents of cognition rather than mere causal influences on 
cognitive processes that remain completely “brain bound” (see Adams and Aizawa 2008 and Rupert 
2009 for criticisms). Failure to make the case for constitution over causation opens these researchers 
to the second worry we expressed above: they have not identified anything novel about embodied 
cognition because psychologists have long known that the world causally contributes in numerous 
ways to cognitive processes.  
 The third theme, Replacement, shall be the focus in the section below. The basic idea behind 
Replacement is that features of embodiment work to facilitate cognition in previously unrecognized 
ways. Replacement departs from traditional cognitive psychology in eschewing its strong 
commitment to a computational theory of mind, according to which cognition is an entirely 
computational process that involves the operation of algorithms over representational states, and in 
seeking to replace computationalism with something else (e.g dynamical systems theory). In its most 
radical form, Replacement advances the idea that thought processes involve no representational 
states at all, and thus have no need for computational processes (Shapiro 2013). Surely this claim 
goes too far, offering no positive account of how to construe cognitive capacities such as memory or 
planning in a non-representational format (see Shapiro 2014b for discussion). More mildly, and 
promisingly, advocates of Replacement see the body as “stepping in” to do work that once would 
have been attributed to computational processes. It is to this milder strain of replacement we now 
turn. 
2. From Programs to Bodies 
 As the behaviorism that dominated psychology in the middle part of the twentieth century 
gave way to computational theories of cognition, psychologists interested in bodily movement 
endorsed the idea that such movements were under the control of a motor program (Keele 1968; 
Schmidt 1976). Schmidt, a significant figure in the development of the motor program concept, 
summarizes the view:  
 The program is generally thought to contain a centrally stored, prestructured set of 
muscle commands that are capable of carrying out movement without feedback 
information about the achievement of the environmental goal. Viewed this way, the 
program must determine which muscles contract, in what order, with what force, 
and for how long…(1976: 242). 
Although the motor program concept evolved over the course of continued investigation, the basic 
idea (still with us today, as in Neilson and Neilson 2005) maintains a strong commitment to a 
computational theory of cognition. The motor program is, in a fairly literal sense, a computer 
program. It contains instructions written in a language of thought that the nervous system must first 
read and then execute. “Before we reach out for an object,” Ghez explains, “our nervous system 
must first select a motor program that specifies (1) the sequence of muscles needed to bring the 
hand to the desired point in space and (2) how much each muscle must contract” (1985, p. 494). 
Presumably, Ghez would claim, the nervous system of the batter we mentioned above would have 
selected a series of commands that caused the muscles in the batter’s arms to flex and extend in just 
the right way to produce a base hit. 
 The motor program approach to explaining muscle control is in keeping with the more 
general computational theory of cognition that retains prominence in most psychology departments 
today. Memory, for instance, might be analyzed in terms of stored representations that are recalled 
for current inspection; processes of language production tap into representations of grammatical 
rules that dictate the form of linguistic structures; vision involves the application of algorithms to 
information derived from the retinal image. Although proponents of embodied cognition have 
sought to challenge computationalism as it plays out across the broad domain of psychology, of 
special interest in the present context is the embodied response to motor programs. If muscle 
control is not under the direction of a program that the nervous system executes, from where does 
the control come?  
 Crucial to answering this question is, from an embodied perspective, rejection of the idea 
that control must come from a controller. Various research programs within embodied cognition 
seek to show that muscle control emerges from tight interactions between the body, the nervous 
system, and the environment. Notions central to the computational theory of cognition – program, 
representation, executor – are discarded, to be replaced with notions better suited to describe the 
continuous interactions between brain, body, and world. Often, these new notions draw from the 
conceptual resources of dynamical systems theory.  
 Well-studied in this context is the development of stepping behavior in infants. A behavior 
such as walking requires delicate coordination between two legs. It is easy to take for granted that 
the legs of walking bipeds must move 180 degrees out of phase relative to each other (Thelen & 
Ulrich 1991: 60). But, of course, there are many more ways for stepping to go wrong than to go 
right. The legs might move in parallel, as they would if hopping. One leg might move at a slower 
frequency than another, or with a larger amplitude. Moreover, each leg contains over a dozen 
muscles. There are joints at the hip, the knee, and the ankle. Designing a motor program that 
maintains control of all of these factors, coordinating them with the precision necessary to produce 
a fluid gait, would be no easy task. 
 Progress in understanding how the nervous system accomplishes this difficult feat begins 
with the realization that a leg can be treated as a spring with a certain tension and weighted by a 
specific mass. Just as a spring will equilibrate to the same length given any initial stretching or 
compression, so too the musculature of the leg insures that it will tend toward a particular 
orientation regardless of its displacement. Thelen and Ulrich (1991) tested this idea with seven-
month-old infants, who, when held above a treadmill so that the soles of their feet could touch the 
moving belt, engaged in stepping behavior. They conjecture that “the mechanical pulling of the leg 
backward stretches the leg muscles and allows them to store energy, much like stretching a spring 
beyond its equilibrium point. When the leg is stretched to its anatomical limit, it uses this stored 
energy to spring forward” (1991: 43).  
 Of course, the development and production of stepping behavior in human beings cannot, 
as it might be in the “passive walkers” that roboticists have created (Collins, et al. 2005), be 
attributed solely to the interaction of the spring-loaded legs with the environment. The effect of the 
moving treadmill belt on the legs does not account for why the legs adopt a pattern of stepping in 
which they adopt the necessary 180 degree out-of-phase motion. The nervous system must be 
involved in such calibration. But the contribution the nervous system makes to stepping behavior 
should not be taken to diminish the extent of the departure from a motor program explanation of 
motion that work like Thelen and colleagues’ presents.  
 In the first place, conceiving of the legs as weighted springs that, in effect, oscillate like 
pendula, opens the way for recruiting a new explanatory framework for understanding limb 
movements. In particular, the language of dynamical systems, with its reference to state spaces, 
attractors, and control variables – concepts useful for characterizing the behavior of systems like 
pendula that change over time – lends insight into behavior that would otherwise have been forced 
into a computational framework of dubious appropriateness. Thelen and Ulrich, for instance, 
identified the alternating pattern of stepping behavior on the treadmill into which 7 month old 
infants settled as an attractor point. Because the behavior of a dynamical system heads toward an 
attractor point from various initial conditions, Thelen and Ulrich predicted that infants’ stepping 
would “resolve” into the alternating step pattern despite perturbations to the system. After inducing 
several perturbations – one in which the treadmill speed was increased, another in which a split 
treadmill caused the infants’ legs to move at different speeds – Thelen and Ulrich confirmed their 
prediction. The alternating step attractor “pulled” the initially disrupted stepping behavior back into 
stability (1991). This example displays how dynamical systems theory can be applied to a domain 
once thought to be most fruitfully investigated from a computational perspective.  
 The example also highlights a prominent theme within embodied cognition literature. We 
mentioned above that the nervous system remains an important contributor to stepping behavior. 
Maintenance of the anti-phase motions of the legs seems to require that information about the state 
of one leg regulate the state of the other (Thelen & Ulrich 1991: 61). But, even if a computational 
description of how such information is processed turns out, in the end, to offer the best 
understanding of this particular feature of stepping behavior, one must not lose sight of how 
recognition of the body’s physical properties constrains and minimizes candidate motor program 
explanations. This idea illustrates the Replacement theme we introduced in the previous section. 
 Replacement, in this case, involves the elimination of computational processes in favor of 
simple mechanics. We noted already that the leg contains over a dozen muscles and three joints. A 
motor program that succeeded in controlling the behavior of these components and synchronizing 
them with the same number of components in the other leg would, doubtless, require sophisticated 
and elaborate neural computations. How much simpler the task becomes when conceiving of the 
legs as simple springs! Because springs behave as they do in virtue of their tension and mass, there is 
no need for motor program to guide their behavior – no more need than there is for a motor 
program to guide the behavior of a slinky as it descends a staircase. And, to the extent that 
computation is necessary for tasks such as calibration of the two legs, the conception of the legs as 
single spring-like units reduces the complexity of the algorithms needed to control their behavior. As 
Thelen, Kelso, and Fogel note, “The dynamic conceptualization allows, in short, for much less 
information to be abstractly represented, and much more information in the sense of a wide variety 
of trajectories to come ‘for free.’”(1987: 45).  
 We see, then, one way in which an embodied approach to cognition might contribute to an 
understanding of athletic performance. Examination of the mechanical properties of the body 
suggests ways in which certain tasks, once thought to require computational solutions, might be 
better explained with a non-computational alternative. Such an explanation replaces computational 
talk with descriptions of the dynamical behavior of the body. The batter who connects with the ball 
speeding toward his chest does something fantastically complicated, no doubt; but, it turns out, the 
task is less computationally demanding as one might first have supposed. The batter’s arms are, after 
all, physical objects whose motion is subject to the same sort of dynamical analysis that emphasizes 
the mechanical – in contrast to computational – forces at work in an infant’s stepping behavior. On 
this conception, the role of the motor program shifts from omniscient planner, responsible for 
controlling the contraction and extension of individual muscles, to opportunistic cobbler, taking 
advantage of the dynamical properties that muscles, bones, and joints bring for free. 
 If an embodied perspective on bodily movement reveals how the brain’s computational 
burden might be reduced by taking advantage of the body’s natural dynamics, so too does a focus on 
embodiment show perceptual processes to be far less computationally expensive than traditional 
cognitive science would suppose. Wonderfully illustrative of this embodiment-inspired shift from 
computational explanations of perception is research that investigates how an outfielder manages to 
catch a fly ball. That outfielders – amateurs as well as professionals – seem to have little difficulty 
tracking a ball from the instant of its impact with a bat to the second before it hits the ground, 
which may involve a distance of over 100m, appears to be quite a marvel. Somehow, the outfielder 
manages to position himself exactly where he needs to be to intercept the ball. Moreover, given the 
initial distance between the outfielder and the ball, cues that might be useful for depth perception, 
such as parallax and disparity, are ineffective.  
One way to explain how the outfielder maneuvers his body to just where it needs to be treats 
the task as a difficult computational problem. The idea is that the outfielder makes a prediction 
about the trajectory the ball will take after impact with the bat. The inputs to the computation 
include such things as the force with which the ball was hit, its direction as it leaves the bat, and its 
speed. But also included in the computation must be factors like wind direction, air resistance, and 
the ball’s spin. This so-called “Trajectory Prediction” explanation of the outfielder’s performance 
assumes that all of these inputs feed into various cognitive systems that then grind through the 
appropriate computations, returning as output the location where the ball will drop, which is then 
used to guide the movement of the outfielder.  
Of course, this computation-heavy explanation of how an outfielder intercepts a fly ball is 
possible in principle. But research suggests that outfielders are in fact not very good at predicting the 
trajectory a ball will take (Shaffer & McBeath 2005). Psychologists who study the outfielder problem 
have largely abandoned computational solutions in favor of those that assign a prominent role to the 
outfielder’s ability to track continuously a single variable. The outfielder moves his body in such a 
way as to keep this variable constant, or invariant.  
One such explanation, Linear Optical Trajectory (LOT), requires that the outfielder position 
himself so that the fly ball, which in fact has a parabolic trajectory, will appear to ascend in a straight 
line from home plate (see Figure 1). Once having situated himself in a position where the ball’s 
trajectory appears to be a straight line, the outfielder will in the exact location he needs to be to 
catch the ball. As Andy Clark describes the LOT method, “[i]nstead of using sensing to get enough 
information inside, past the visual bottleneck, so as to allow the reasoning system to ‘throw away the 
world’ and solve the problem wholly internally, it uses the sensor as an open conduit allowing 
environmental magnitudes to exert a constant influence on behavior” (Clark 2007: 266, his 
emphasis). 
 
Figure 1: The ball’s trajectory is parabolic, but the outfielder’s motion 
can make it appear linear and ascending (McBeath, Shaffer, and 
Kaiser 1995). 
 Competing with LOT is an alternative explanation that, while sharing LOT’s emphasis on 
the outfielder’s need to track a single variable, chooses a different variable. According to Optical 
Acceleration Cancellation (OAC), the outfielder must position himself so that the upwards 
acceleration of the ball is fixed at a constant rate. Deviation from a constant rate provides the 
outfielder with cues that allow him to adjust his location relative to the ball. If the ball’s acceleration 
appears to slow as it climbs upward, the outfielder must move forward to catch it. On the other 
hand, if the ball’s acceleration appears to increase, the outfielder must move backwards to catch it 
(see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 5: The outfielder will intercept the ball when making its 
upwards acceleration appear constant, i.e. to be rising equal distances 
in equal time intervals (Shaffer & McBeath 2002).  
 Recent evidence suggests that OAC is more likely the strategy that outfielders actually use 
(Fink, Foo, and Warren 2009), but in the present context, less important than which of LOT or 
OAC is the correct explanation of the outfielder’s performance is the sense in which these 
explanations offer an embodied alternative to computationally-heavy ones. An explanation like 
Trajectory Prediction, we saw, conceives of the outfielder’s problem as demanding a solution 
consisting of computations over representations of a large number of variables. The output of the 
computations will be a prediction of the ball’s trajectory, and the outfielder’s job is then to move his 
body to the precise location at the end of the trajectory.  
 In contrast, both LOT and OAC seek to replace a computational explanation of the fielder’s 
behavior with one that integrates the outfielder’s motion into the solution. Through his motion, the 
outfielder establishes and then maintains continuous contact with a single variable (linear motion or 
constant acceleration). There is simply no need to represent such things as the ball’s initial direction 
and speed. Factors like wind and air-resistance are rendered irrelevant insofar as they become 
subsumed within linear motion or constant acceleration. All that matters to the embodied strategies 
is that the outfielder keeps his body in a position where the ball appears to be moving straight up or 
with a constant acceleration.  
 We have seen two examples now where an embodied perspective on sports performance – 
and performance more generally – marks a departure from more traditional comptutational 
accounts. In the case of calculating limb movements, the idea of a motor program that computes 
how muscles must flex and extend in order to move the limb is replaced by dynamical systems 
approaches that conceive of muscles and limbs as spring-masses or oscillators. As such, limbs will 
exhibit “for free” certain kinds of behavior, and the job of the nervous system shifts from one of 
designing and selecting precise motor programs to a vastly simpler one of governing the actions of 
simple machines with latent patterns of motion that need only to be released and coordinated. In the 
second case, we see how a body in motion can establish and maintain contact with a single variable, 
rendering unnecessary the sophisticated computations that a stationary observer would otherwise 
require in order to accomplish a task such as catching a fly ball. Embodied cognition, as we 
understand it, thus invites sports psychologists to hunt for explanations of athletic performance that 
minimize the computational demands on a nervous system that seems better conceived of as a 
source of control for a body already primed for movement and perception. 
3. The Social Aspect of Sports 
Above we distinguished three themes of embodied cognition: Conceptualization, 
Constitution, and Replacement. The discussion of motor programs illustrates the fruitfulness of 
replacing traditional computational explanations with explanations that focus on bodily mechanics. 
Here we focus on the social aspect of sports, which provides nice examples of Conceptualization 
and builds further connections between embodied cognition and sports psychology.  
Many sports involve interpreting and anticipating the behavior of other athletes. In 
basketball, for example, an athlete not only must execute actions in light of her immediate goals and 
overall game strategy, she also must coordinate her actions with her teammates’ complementary 
actions and opponents’ disruptive, incompatible actions. Coordinating her actions with teammates 
and opponents’ actions requires interpreting their behavior and anticipating what they will do next. 
For instance, she must recognize when an opponent is driving to the basket (as opposed to faking a 
drive to open enough space to shoot), she must anticipate the positions in which her teammates will 
be when the opponent is driving to the basket, and decide whether to pursue the driving opponent 
or let a better positioned teammate step in to defend against the drive. This dynamic interaction 
happens very quickly, and superior athletes are more highly skilled at coordinating their behavior 
with teammates and opponents’ behavior.  
Coordination between executing one’s own actions and anticipating others’ actions is not 
unique to team sports. Even in so-called individual sports, such as running, boxing, and karate, the 
athlete’s actions are influenced by what she takes other athletes to be doing. Take running, for 
example. In a track race, a runner approaches the competition with a general race plan. In most 
cases, executing the race plan will depend on others athletes’ performances. Suppose the race plan is 
to finish in the top two spots (in order to advance to the next round of competition, for example). 
The athlete must determine whether the runners around her are struggling more than she is and 
whether runners that pass her can sustain that pace. She must moderate her own effort so that she 
has enough energy left to finish strongly at the end of the race all the while making sure she is well 
positioned in terms of place and effort in relation to the other athletes. As this example shows, 
individual sports involve coordination between one’s own actions and competitors’ actions, as well.  
Given that many sports involve this social element, the following question arises: How do 
we coordinate our actions with others’ actions in sports? Neuroscientists have discovered that action 
execution and action observation recruit some of the same neurological systems. More specifically, 
research on mirror neurons has shown that parts of the sensorimotor system that are responsible for 
producing planned actions are also partly responsible for interpreting and anticipating others’ 
actions, which suggests that performing a particular action and perceiving that action are closely 
related skills, realized by the same neural mechanism (Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, 2009; Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). We describe the action mirror neuron system in more detail below.1 
The action mirror neuron system consists of the premotor cortex and parts of the posterior 
parietal cortex, specifically, the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule and the lower part of the 
precentral gyrus plus the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus. These areas are involved in 
sensory guidance of movement and the production of planned movements. Scientists have 
discovered two kinds of mirror neurons in these areas: strictly congruent and broadly congruent 
mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Strictly congruent mirror neurons fire for the 
execution or observation of particular narrowly construed behaviors. For example, a group of 
strictly congruent mirror neurons will fire only when a subject observes or executes a pincer grasp to 
pick up an object. These same neurons will not fire when the subject executes or observes a full-
hand grasp. Other groups of strictly congruent mirror neurons fire only for full-hand grasps. Broadly 
congruent mirror neurons, in contrast, fire for the same action less narrowly construed. For 
example, a particular group of broadly congruent mirror neurons will fire when the subject observes 
or executes both pincer grasps or full-hand grasps. The same group of neurons will fire when the 
subject uses its hand to pick up a piece of food to eat or when it observes another subject use a tool 
to pick up the food to eat. Broadly congruent mirror neurons are both visuo-motor, as the previous 
                                                
1 For more comprehensive overviews of the mirror neuron system, see Rizzolatti and Craighero 
(2004), Pineda (2009), and Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010). 
examples show, and audio-motor. If a subject hears, e.g., someone eating food, mirror neurons that 
correspond to mouth-related actions will fire.  
A subset of broadly congruent mirror neurons, so-called logically related mirror neurons, is 
particularly important for action perception (Csibra, 2007; Iacoboni, 2005; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010). These neurons have all the features of broadly congruent mirror neurons and one interesting 
additional feature: they fire for the end-state of an action sequence even when the end-state is 
unobserved. For example, logically related mirror neurons fire for the act of grasping an object or, 
upon observing another’s grasping motion, they fire for the motor act of eating.  In the first-person 
case, the neurons fire while executing a certain action, A, but in the third-person case they fire in 
expectation of B, the probable next behavior in the sequence. Thus, these mirror neurons predict or 
anticipate the target’s next behavior. 
Although there is no consensus on the precise role of mirror neurons in action 
understanding, the evidence suggests that mirror neurons are at least part of the neural substrate of 
action interpretation and anticipation (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). The activation of strictly 
congruent mirror neurons provides information about the precise details of the observed action 
(e.g., that it is a whole-handed grasp), and broadly congruent mirror neurons provide more general 
information about the observed action (e.g., that it is an eating-related grasp). Logically related 
mirror neurons function as predictive mechanism for familiar behaviors (e.g., they fire in expectation 
of eating), thus providing information about the probable next behavior in a sequence. Each kind of 
mirror neuron provides different information about the observed action, and this information 
facilitates action interpretation and anticipation of others’ actions.2 
Of course, the patterns of neural activation for action execution and observation do not 
completely overlap. For example, the observer’s brain exhibits various inhibitory responses that 
                                                
2 See Spaulding (2013) for an extended defense of these claims. 
prevent the observer from actually performing the action, the actor’s brain receives and processes 
proprioceptive information that the observer’s brain does not, and the neural activity in the actor’s 
mirror neuron system is stronger than in the observer’s mirror neuron system. Although motor 
mirror neuron activity may be strong enough to produce covert, unconscious movements, in normal 
cases the observer does not act exactly as the observed target acts. Nevertheless, the discovery that 
action observation and execution recruit the very same neurons is an intriguing finding, and it has 
significant implications for sports psychology. 
Putting all of this together, the neuroscientific research on mirror neurons suggests that 
action observation and execution share a common neural basis, viz. the mirror neuron system. Thus, 
we have at least a partial answer to our question about how action coordination occurs: the same 
system underlies both production and observation of action. Mirror neurons are deployed one way 
(in conjunction with other neural systems) when executing an action, and they are deployed another 
way (in conjunction with other neural systems) when observing others execute that action. 
To illustrate how mirror neurons work, we used relatively simple actions, but the same 
lessons apply to the more complex actions involved in sports. Driving toward the basket and 
observing an opponent drive toward the basket activate the same neural system. One interesting 
implication of this tight coupling between motor and perceptual processes is that the more skilled 
one becomes at performing a particular action the better one will be at interpreting and anticipating 
the outcome of that action. For example, these findings imply that expert golfers should be better at 
putting, but they also should be better at perceptually discriminating and predicting the trajectory of 
others’ putts. This implication is empirically substantiated in the literature on sports psychology.  
As it turns out, the ability to perceive athletic behaviors differs according to one’s experience 
in producing those behaviors (Shiffrar & Heinen, 2015). Expert athletes are better than novice 
athletes and mere spectators at interpreting and predicting the outcome of athletic behaviors that are 
similar to the ones they perform. For example, a professional basketball player can judge more 
accurately whether or not a player is faking a drive to the basket and whether or not a shot will go in 
the basket than a novice or spectator can. Female ballet dancers can perceptually discriminate the 
choreography of female ballet dancers better than male ballet dancers, even though male ballet 
dancers frequently observe female ballet choreography. In both of these examples, the motor 
expertise seems to bring about perceptual expertise. And this is just what one would expect given 
that the same neural system underlies action production and perception.  
Focusing on how one’s body influences one’s perception illustrates a central theme of 
embodied cognition we introduced above, namely Conceptualization. The idea begins with 
recognition that through extended practice, athletes’ bodies become more adept at executing 
particular skills. In turn, the brains of these athletes, and in particular their mirror neurons, become 
tuned to recognizing actions of a particular kind. This tuning enables athletes to perceive 
movements, or patterns of movement, that remain invisible to novices. Insofar as these perceptual 
feats reflect abilities to categorize certain motions as, e.g., driving to the basket, or, in ballet, a saute, 
they illustrate the idea of Conceptualization. The athletes see or conceive of the world (or of the 
motions of individuals in the world) differently than do non-athletes. Were we to focus just on 
explicating computational motor programs underwriting athletic performance, we would miss this 
insight.  
Importantly, this coupling between athletic performance and perception has implications for 
sports psychology, as well. The effects of this tight coupling between motor and perceptual 
processes explain why novice athletes and spectators substantially overestimate their own athletic 
abilities, a phenomenon known as the Dunning-Kruger effect. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a 
cognitive bias in which the more knowledgeable and competent one is, the more accurately one 
assesses one’s knowledge and competence. Individuals who are not knowledgeable or competent 
with respect to some issue egregiously overestimate their own knowledge and competence and fail 
to recognize others’ equal or superior knowledge and competence (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). For 
example, people who have poor social skills tend to overestimate their ability to figure out what 
other people are thinking or feeling, whereas those who are more socially skilled give a more 
accurate assessment of their ability to “read” other people (Ames & Kammrath, 2004; Realo et al., 
2003). In general, the deficiency of the less competent is invisible to them because recognizing their 
deficiency requires the very competency they lack.  
In sports, this effect can be observed in the difference between an elite athlete’s assessment 
of his athletic skills and the self-assessment of novices or spectators. The preceding discussion can 
help us explain how this bias arises. Performing athletic maneuvers in a particular sport increases 
your ability to perceptually discriminate athletic maneuvers in that sport. Thus, practicing putting 
makes one better able to assess the difficulty of a particular putt, visually analyze and predict the 
outcome of the putt, and more accurately assess one’s ability to make this putt. Novice golfers and 
spectators are less adept at visually analyzing the difficulty of the putt and less able to accurately 
assess their ability to make the putt. Thus, for novice golfers and spectators, a particularly difficult 
putt literally looks easier. 
The discussion so far explains the correlation between motor and perceptual abilities and the 
cognitive bias that results from this. The previous findings focus on elite athletes, novices, and 
spectators’ passive observations of athletic behaviors. In most sporting events, however, athletes must 
interpret and anticipate others’ behavior while at the same time executing their own athletic 
behaviors. The coupling between motor and perceptual processes also helps us to understand what 
happens when athletes interacting in an athletic competition have to balance motorically producing 
their own behavior and perceiving others’ behavior.  
In this interactive context, because motor and perceptual processes are realized in part by the 
same neurological system, action perception and production compete for the same neurological 
resources. In other words, focusing on producing athletic behavior may impair one’s ability to 
perceive athletic behaviors, and focusing on perceiving athletic behaviors may impair one’s ability to 
produce athletic behaviors. The skills that are disrupted will depend on the skill level of the athlete. 
As a novice basketball player, one must focus one’s attention and effort on dribbling the 
basketball properly, i.e., pushing the basketball to the ground at the right angle, force, and cadence. 
As one practices more, the simple skill of dribbling becomes easier and one does not need to focus 
on it to do it well. At the intermediate level, one masters dribbling in more challenging contexts, e.g., 
running and dribbling, dribbling with a defender trying to get the ball, etc. For expert basketball 
players, dribbling becomes automatized and requires no conscious attention. Indeed, focusing on 
dribbling may in fact disrupt their performance. The automation of basic skills like dribbling frees up 
the expert’s attention for more complex athletic moves and strategic plays (Christensen, Sutton, & 
McIlwain, 2016).  
Given the nature of skill mastery, what is impaired when one is perceiving and executing 
athletic behaviors depends on one’s skill level. For novices, observing others dribble may disrupt 
one’s own attempt at dribbling, and focusing on dribbling may make it difficult to observe others 
dribbling. Indeed, for this reason it is amusing to watch a group of children learn how to dribble 
basketballs. For intermediate level athletes, dribbling itself requires no conscious attention. Driving 
to the hoop, however, is more challenging, and doing this while perceiving a defender may disrupt 
one’s ability to execute the drive. For expert basketball players, the previous skills are relatively easy 
and more or less automated. This frees up the expert’s attention to focus on strategy, e.g., running 
plays to orchestrate a height mismatch between an offensive and defensive player. Executing a more 
complex athletic move may interfere with the expert athlete’s ability to interpret and anticipate 
opponents’ moves, thereby disrupting her ability to run effective strategic plays. 
A further consequence of how production and perception are coordinated is that interacting 
athletes sometimes are so focused on executing their own actions that they do not perceive 
opponents’ overt disruptive actions. As sports fans can attest, it is baffling to see elite athletes miss 
glaring opportunities. In these instances, interacting athletes’ perception of other athletes’ behavior 
may be impaired even in comparison to spectators. Though perplexing to sports fans, this 
impairment is a straightforward consequence of how perception and motor production are 
coordinated in the sensorimotor system. Given that action execution and perception involve the 
same neurological resources, when one of these tasks is much more demanding, it diminishes the 
ability to achieve the other task. 
4. Conclusion 
 The body contributes to cognition in surprising ways – ways that more standard 
computationally-oriented approaches to cognition often fail to appreciate. In this chapter we have 
focused on how the mechanics of the body can replace the need for computational solutions to 
various motor and perceptual tasks. We have also examined the neural basis for social cognition, 
which can result in perceptual and conceptual refinements that reflect an individual’s specific history 
of interaction with objects, including other individuals, in her environment. Sports psychologists 
have been quick to notice the significance of these ideas in their efforts to understand athletic 
performance. Indeed, some sports psychologists have been instrumental in expanding and 
developing research programs within embodied cognition (see especially Beilock 2008). We believe 
that continued erosion in the disciplinary boundaries between embodied cognition and sports 
psychology will bring tremendous benefits to both fields.  
 
 References  
Adams, F. & Aizawa, K. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Ames, D. R., & Kammrath, L. K. (2004). Mind-reading and metacognition: Narcissism, not actual 
competence, predicts self-estimated ability. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 28(3), 187-209.  
 
Barrett, L. (2012). Emotions are real. Emotion, 12, 413-429. 
 
Beer. R. (2003). The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent. Adaptive 
Behavior, 11, 209-243. 
 
Beilock, S. (2008). Beyond the playing field: Sport psychology meets embodied cognition. 
International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1(1), 19-30. 
 
Brooks, R. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139-159. 
  
Christensen, W., Sutton, J., & McIlwain, D. J. (2016). Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control 
and the varieties of skill experience. Mind & Language, 31(1), 37-66.  
 
Clark, A. (2007). “Re-inventing ourselves: The plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind. Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, 32, 263-282. 
  
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind, Analysis, 58, 7-19. 
Collins, S., Ruina, A., Tedrake, R., and Wisse, M. (2005). Efficient bipedal robots based on passive-
dynamic walkers. Science, 307, 1082-1085.  
 
Csibra, G. (2007). Action mirroring and action interpretation: An alternative account. In P. Haggard, 
Y. Rosetti, & M. Kawato (Eds.), Sensorimotor Foundations of Higher Cognition: Attention and 
Performance: Oxford University Press. 
  
Descartes, R. (1641/1993). Meditations on First Philosophy. D. Cress (Trans., 3rd. ed.). Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co. 
 
Fink, P., Foo, P., and Warren, W. (2009). Catching fly balls in virtual reality: A critical test of the 
outfielder problem. Journal of Vision, 9, 1-8. 
 
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: 
From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 308(5722), 662-667.  
  
Gallese, V. (2009). Motor abstraction: A neuroscientific account of how action goals and intentions 
are mapped and understood. Psychological Research, 73(4), 486-498.  
  
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396-403.  
 
Ghez, C. (1985). Voluntary movement. In E. Kandel, and J. Schwartz (Eds), Principles of Neural 
Science, 2nd ed. (493-501). New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co Inc.  
Gibson, J.J. (1979). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
 
Glenberg, A. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 20, 1-55. 
  
Iacoboni, M. (2005). Understanding others: Imitation, language, empathy. In S. Hurley & N. Chater 
(Eds.), Perspectives on Imitation: Mechanisms of imitation and imitation in animals (Vol. 1, pp. 77-99). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Kaschak, M., Madden, C., Therriault, D., Yaxley, R., Aveyard, M. and Blanchard, A. (2005). 
Perception of motion effects on language processing. Cognition, 94, B79-B89. 
 
Keele, S. (168).  Movement control in skilled motor performance. Psychological Bulletin, 70, 387- 403.  
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's 
own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of personality and social psychology, 
77(6), 1121.  
 
McBeath, M., Shaffer, D., and Kaiser, M. (1995). “How baseball outfielders determine where to run 
to catch fly balls. Science, 268, 569–573. 
 
Neilson, P. & Neilson, M. (2005). An overview of adaptive model theory: solving the problems of 
redundancy, resources, and nonlinear interactions in human movement control. Journal of 
Neural Engineering, 1, S279-S312. 
 
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
O'Regan, K. & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 939-1031. 
  
Pineda, J. A. (2009). Mirror Neuron Systems: The Role of Mirroring Processes in Social Cognition. New York: 
Humana. 
  
Realo, A., Allik, J., Nõlvak, A., Valk, R., Ruus, T., Schmidt, M., & Eilola, T. (2003). Mind-reading 
ability: Beliefs and performance. Journal of Research in Personality, 37(5), 420-445.  
  
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27(1), 
169-192.  
  
Rizzolatti, G., & Sinigaglia, C. (2010). The functional role of the parieto-frontal mirror circuit: 
interpretations and misinterpretations. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 11(4), 264-274.  
 
Rupert, R. (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shaffer, D. & McBeath, M. (2005). Naïve beliefs in baseball: Systematic distortion in perceived time 
of apex for fly balls. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 1492-
1501. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2008). The embodied cognition research programme. Philosophy Compass, 2, 338-346. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2011). Embodied Cognition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2012). Embodied cognition,” in E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science (pp. 118-147). New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2013). Dynamics and cognition, Minds & Machines, 23, 353-375. 
 
Shapiro, L. (ed.) (2014a). The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. New York: Routledge. 
 
Shapiro, L. (2014b). Review of Hutto, D. and Myin, E. Radical Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), Mind, 123, 213-220. 
 
Schmidt, R. (1976). Control processes in motor skills. Exercise & Sport Sciences Reviews, 4(1), 229-262. 
 
Shiffrar, M., & Heinen, T. (2015). Die Fähigkeiten von Athleten verändern deren Wahrnehmung 
von Handlungen. Zeitschrift für Sportpsychologie.  
  
Spaulding, S. (2013). Mirror neurons and social cognition. Mind & Language, 28(2).  
 
Thelen, E., Kelso, J. and Fogel, A. (1987). Self-organizing systems and infant motor development. 
Developmental Review, 7, 39–65. 
 
Thelen, E. and Ulrich, B. (1991). Hidden skills: A dynamic systems analysis of treadmill stepping 
during the first year. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 56: 1-97. 
 
Webb, B. (1996). A cricket robot. Scientific American, 275, 62-67. 
  
 
 
